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There is recent evidence that we directly map observed actions of other agents onto our own 
motor repertoire, referred to as direct matching (Iacoboni et al., 1999). This was shown when 
we are actively engaged in joint action with others’ (Sebanz et al. 2003) and also when 
observing irrelevant movements while executing congruent or incongruent movements (Brass 
et al., 2000). However, an open question is whether direct matching in humans is limited to 
the perception of intentional agents. Recent research provides contradictory evidence with 
respect to the question whether the direct matching system has a biological bias possibly 
emerging from perceptual differences of the stimulus display. In the present study all 
participants performed a motor priming task observing the identical animation showing finger 
lifting movements of a hand in a leather glove. Before running the experiment we presented 
either a human hand or a wooden analogue hand wearing the leather glove. We found a motor 
priming effect both, for human and wooden hands. However, motor priming was larger when 
participants believed that they interacted with a human hand than when they believed to 
interact with a wooden hand. The stronger motor priming effect for the biological agent 
suggests that the ‘direct matching system’ is tuned to represent actions of animate agents. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is now widely acknowledged that observed behaviour is automatically mapped onto the 
observer’s motor repertoire (Iacoboni, Woods, Brass, Bekkering, Mazziotta, & Rizzolatti, 
1999). This ability to motorically simulate other people’s behaviour is believed to provide the 
foundation for social interactions (Decety & Jackson, 2004) and action understanding 
(Gallese & Goldman, 1998). 
Behaviourally, direct matching of others’ actions was shown with motor priming paradigms 
(Brass & Heyes, 2005 and Blakemore & Frith, 2005). In such paradigms, participants have to 
carry out simple actions in response to a symbolic stimulus while observing congruent or 
incongruent actions. In a widely used experimental setup participants have to respond to a 
symbolic number stimulus ("1" or "2") while observing a task-irrelevant interfering finger 
lifting movement of another person. It was demonstrated that the observation of the finger 
movement activates a corresponding motor response in the observer which can lead to 
facilitation if the movement is congruent and to interference if it is incongruent (Brass, 
Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000; Bertenthal, Longo, & Kosobud, 2006).  
 
Biological tuning of direct matching? 
It is an open question whether direct matching in humans is limited to the perception of 
intentional agents. A biological tuning is predicted by theories assuming that direct matching 
originates from sensori-motor learning (Brass & Heyes, 2005; Keysers & Perrett, 2004). 
Behavioural studies have found such a bias for human action as compared to robot actions 
(Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003; Press, Bird, Flach, & Heyes, 2005; Tsai and Brass, 
2007) and so do some neuroimaging studies (Perani, Fazio, Borghese, Tettamanti, Ferrari, 
Decety, & Gilardi, 2001; Tai, Scherfler, Brooks, Sawamoto, Castiello, 2004). Evidence for a 
human-specific direct-matching system is, however, not unambiguous. A recent neuroimaging 
study showed contrasting evidence when comparing human and robotic actions (Gazzola, 
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Rizzolatti, Wicker, & Keysers, 2007). Also new behavioural work (Jansson, Wilson, 
Williams, & Mon-Williams, 2007; Stanley, Gowen, & Miall, 2007) showed comparable 
effects elicited by simple moving dots when the dot stimulus followed a biologically plausible 
or implausible velocity profile. When participants were informed that they observe dot stimuli 
that represent pre-recorded human movements they found an interference effect but the effect 
was absent when the dot motion was described as computer generated. In line with the latter 
findings Liepelt, von Cramon, & Brass (2008) showed differential automatic imitation effects 
for human finger movements depending on whether the observer attributed the movement as 
intentionally produced or not. The aim of the present study was to test whether the direct 
matching system is prone to top-down influence or not. This was tested by manipulating 
participant’s belief regarding the animacy of the stimuli. All participants performed the same 
motor priming task observing an animation of a leather hand. Before running the experiment, 
two groups of subjects were presented two different static hand models (human/wooden). We 
showed one group of subjects a real human hand  wearing a leather glove and the other group 
a wooden analogue model of a hand wearing the leather glove (see photographs of the human 
and wooden hand wearing the glove in Fig. 1A and B for illustration). We told participants 
that they will see the respective model also on the screen during the experiment. Both groups 
saw the identical stimulus on the screen showing an ambigous hand stimulus in a leather 
glove (see Fig. 1C). 
We predicted that, if the direct matching system is tuned to the perception of intentional 
agents, one should find increased motor priming effects for the leather hand animation when 
participants believed that it was produced by a human. If, however, the direct matching 
system represent others’ actions independently of the nature of the agent no group differences 
should be found. 
 




A group of 20 undergraduate students (9 male, mean age: 23,6) participated in this 
experiment. Ten were given pre-experimental experience with a human leather hand and ten 
were given experience with a wooden leather hand. Participants were randomly assigned to 
both groups. All were right handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were naive 
with regard to the hypotheses of the experiment. Participants were paid 7 € for participation.  
Apparatus and stimuli 
Stimuli were presented on a 17-inch color monitor that was connected to a Pentium I PC. 
Experiments were carried out using ERTS software (Experimental Runtime System; Beringer, 
2000). The sequence of hand movements consisted of two pictures of a right hand positioned 
in the same perspective as the hand of the participant with which the action was executed (see 
Fig. 1C). The presented sequence produced realistic finger movements. As stimuli, we 
presented a hand in a leather glove. We tried to create a relatively ambiguous stimulus that 
would work for both, human and wooden hand models. Actually we used a real hand in the 
glove. To introduce the belief manipulation we used a real human hand (Human) and a 
wooden analogue model of a hand, both in a leather glove. At a viewing distance of 80 cm, 
the hand on the screen subtended a visual angle of 9.57° x 10.27°. The movie consisted of two 
frames only. One starting frame which showed the hand in a resting position and a movement 
frame that showed either the index or the middle finger lifted. Simultaneously with the 
movement frame the numbers were presented between the index and the middle finger of the 
videotaped hand. The number subtended a visual angle of 0.72° x 0.36°. 
________________________________________________________________ 
Please insert Figure 1 about here 
________________________________________________________________ 
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Procedure and Design 
An adopted version of the paradigm developed by Brass et al. (2000) was used in the present 
experiment. Participants had to lift either the index or the middle finger of their right hand in 
response to a number (1: index, 2: middle). The number was displayed together with a photo 
of a right hand from a first person’s perspective on a computer screen, the same orientation as 
participant's response hand. The number always appeared at the same position, located 
between the index finger and the middle finger of the observed hand. As the number 
appeared, either the index or the middle finger of the observed hand was lifted either 
congruently or incongruently to the required response indicated by the number (see Fig. 1C). 
In congruent trials, the observed and the required response finger were identical. In 
incongruent trials, the observed and the required response finger differed. Participants were 
instructed to respond to the numbers irrespective of the observed finger lifting movements. 
Each trial began with a frame lasting for 800 ms showing a resting hand. The second frame 
showed the same hand with one of the fingers completely lifted for 1915 ms. At the same time 
as the movement was presented, additionally a digit appeared between the index and the 
middle finger of the observed hand. A tonal feedback that informed participants about the 
correct use of the response board was given for 50 ms followed by a blank screen of 2100 ms. 
Thus each trial lasted 4865 ms (see Fig. 2). 
The belief manipulation was realized in the following way. Before running the experiment, 
we presented either a static hand of a real human wearing a leather glove (Human group) or a 
wooden analogue model of a hand wearing the leather glove (Wooden group). Both groups 
were given the identical verbal instruction, that they would see short clips of the respective 
hand model on the screen during the experiment. This statement was embedded within the 
overall instructions. We presented the identical leather hand movement to both groups 
(between-group design) to avoid low-level stimulus confounds. In each group the movement 
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was presented for two blocks each consisting of 120 trials, separated by a short break. 
Participant performed 240 trials in total.  
    ________________________________________________________________ 
Please insert Figure 2 about here (Trial sequence) 
________________________________________________________________ 
Rating data  
To investigate how participants of both groups interpreted the observed hand stimulus, we 
acquired additional data. 1) After having performed the experiment, participants had to 
complete a questionnaire, in which they were asked to indicate the extent to which (they 
thought) the static hand model (human/wooden) and the stimulus hand presented on the 
screen during the experiment were matched. 2) To give an indication of the perceived 
intentionality of the observed movement participants were asked to rate how intentional they 
perceived the observed movement to be. Participants responded to both questions using a 5-
point scale ranging from not at all to fully. 
Results 
Data analysis 
In all experiments prior to statistical analyses, all trials in which responses were incorrect or 
slower than 2000 ms were excluded from statistical Reaction Time (RT) analyses. This 
resulted in the elimination of 2.1 % of trials from the data set. One participant was excluded 
from the human group, due to high error rates of more than 15 percent. RTs for all conditions 
are presented in Fig. 3a. 
RT analysis 
We used a 2 x 2-factorial design including the 2-level between-subject factor Group (human, 
wooden) as well as the 2-level factor Congruency (congruent, incongruent) as a within-subject 
variable (see Fig. 3a). The same analysis was conducted for accuracy data (see Fig. 3b). 
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In the present experiment, we observed a main effect of Group, F(1, 17) = 8.76, MSe = 
2615.08, p< .05, partial η2 = .34, participants in the human group were slower than in the 
wooden group. Furthermore, we found a main effect of Congruency, F(1, 17) = 201.16, MSe 
= 267.61, p< .001, partial η2 = .92, due to increased RTs in incongruent compared to 
congruent conditions. Most importantly, a significant interaction between Group x 
Congruency was observed, F(1, 17) = 10.05, MSe = 267,61, p< .05, partial η2 = .37, 
indicating a significantly larger motor priming effect in the human-hand model group as 
compared to the wooden-hand model group. 
________________________________________________________________ 
Please insert Figures 3a and 3b (RTs and percent errors) about here 
________________________________________________________________ 
Post hoc test indicated that in the human-hand model group, attributing the movement as 
triggered by a human agent led to a significant congruency effect of 92 ms, t(8) = -10.40, p< 
.001.  
In the wooden-hand model group attributing the movement as triggered by a non-human 
agent, also lead to a significant congruency effect of 59 ms, t(9) = -9.48, p< .001.  
The motor priming effect in the human-hand model group was 34 ms larger as compared to 
the wooden-hand model group (see Fig. 4). 
________________________________________________________________ 
Please insert Figure 4 (Effects sizes for different conditions) about here 
________________________________________________________________ 
To rule out the possibility that a group difference might have produced the observed 
interaction we computed the same analysis using ratio measures adjusting for the mean 
reaction time difference in both groups.  This was done by calculating the mean value of 
congruent and incongruent RTs per participant. Afterwards, we calculated the mean of these 
values per group, which provides a mean RT level per group. To correct for these RT 
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differences, we built ratios by dividing raw data by the mean RT level per group.  Then we 
performed the identical analyses as for raw RT data. This analysis showed a main effect of 
Congruency, F(1, 17) = 201.04, MSe = .001, p< .001, partial η2 = .92, due to increased ratios 
in incongruent compared to congruent conditions. Importantly, we still observed a significant 
interaction between Group x Congruency, when accounting for possible group differences, 
F(1, 17) = 5.70, MSe = .001, p< .05, partial η2 = .25, ruling out the possibility that the 
differential interference effect between groups was driven by mean RT differences. 
Error analysis 
For errors, we observed no main effect of Group, (F< 1), but a main effect of Congruency, 
F(1, 17) = 23.12, MSe = = 2.96, p< .001, partial η2 = .58, due to an increased error rate in 
incongruent compared to congruent conditions in both groups. Furthermore, we observed no 
significant interaction between Group x Congruency, (F< 1), indicating no differences in 
motor priming between the human-hand model and the wooden-hand model group indicating 
no evidence for a speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT) as an explanation for the observed RT 
effects (see Fig. 3b).  
Rating data  
To determine participants beliefs about the hand presented on the screen, participants were 
asked to indicate the extent to which the model’s hand and the video hand were matched. All 
participants made clear that they believed the stimulus hand to be the same hand as the 
model’s hand presented at the beginning of the experiment by showing relatively high scores 
(average score = 4 out of maximally 5) in matching ratings. 
One might argue that animacy didn't make a difference for motor priming, but just the degree 
of match between the model hand (human/wooden) and the stimulus hand. Non-parametric 
analyses of the matching ratings indicated 1) that the degree of match between the model 
(human/wooden) and the stimulus presented on the screen were not perceived differently 
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between the human-hand model group and the wooden-hand model group (z  = -.88, two-
tailed Mann-Whitney U test, p > .38). 2) The ratings on perceived intentionality, showed a 
numerical trend that the movements on the screen in the human hand-model group were 
perceived also as more intentional as compared to the wooden hand-model group. This 
difference, however, missed statistical significance (z  = -1.64, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U 
test, p < .12.). This is in line with the idea that the larger motor priming effect in the human 
animate condition is driven by the perceived intentionality of the movement. 
DISCUSSION 
The aim of the present study was to investigate the fundamental question whether the direct 
matching system is prone to top-down influence or not. This question was tested under 
perceptually identical task conditions using a belief manipulation about the animacy of an 
observed action. In the present study participants performed a motor priming task (Brass et 
al., 2000) with an animation of a moving leather hand. Before running the experiment, we 
presented either a human model wearing a leather glove or a wooden hand analogue wearing 
the leather glove. We replicated previous findings showing an automatic tendency to imitate 
(Brass et al., 2000; Stürmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000) by measuring the motor priming 
effect produced by a task-irrelevant finger lifting movement on an actually executed 
movement. A basic motor priming effect was present regardless of whether participants 
believed that the movement was executed by a biological or a non-biological agent. However, 
importantly motor priming effects were larger when participants believed to interact with a 
human hand rather than a wooden hand. Because we used the identical stimuli for both, the 
human hand-model group and the wooden hand-model group, the present findings can not be 
explained by perceptual differences of the stimuli. These findings are in line with results 
showing a top-down modulation of motor priming effects (e.g. Stanley et al., 2007; Longo 
and Bertenthal, 2009). 
Animacy and Motor Priming 
 11 
One might, however argue that the larger motor priming effect in the "real" hand movie is not 
due to the difference in animacy, but just to the degree of match between the static hand 
model presented before the experiment and the stimulus presented during the experiment. 
We think that this alternative explanation is rather unlikely. First, during the experimental 
testing the stimuli were animated while in the demonstration phase we showed an unanimated 
hand. Furthermore, participants rated the match between the stimuli presented in the 
instruction phase and the experimental phase equally high in both conditions.  
Interestingly, the magnitude of the motor priming effect in the human condition of the present 
experiment seems larger than that observed in previous studies using a similar paradigm 
(Bertenthal et al., 2006; Brass et al., 2000). However, it is very difficult to compare the 
absolute motor priming effect across studies. First, the timing is quite different in different 
studies and this might have an impact on the size of the interference effect.  Secondly, the 
perspective from which the model’s hand is observed also differs between studies. Previous 
experiments presented stimuli from the third person’s perspective while the present study uses 
the first persons perspective. From an ideomotor theory point of view (James, 1890; Prinz, 
1997) one could argue that priming effects should be larger for the first person perspective 
because of the higher dimensional overlap of the observed and executed action (Kornblum, 
Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990).  
In order to rule out the possibility that the higher mean reaction time in the human hand 
condition led to a relative increase of the interference effect we computed the relative 
interference effect.  However, also for this ratio measure the larger interference effect in the 
human hand condition remained reliable. To conclude, the present findings strongly suggest 
that the belief about animacy modulates motor priming in a top-down manner. 
 Intention Priming rather than Motor Priming 
This assumption is also in accordance with other recent approaches to investigate the effect of 
observed biological motion. Using a joint action paradigm (Sebanz et al. 2003), Tsai & Brass 
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(2007) found evidence for a joint Simon effect in a social context in which participants 
coacted with a computer-animated human hand. Importantly, they demonstrate that this social 
Simon effect was biologically tuned and occurs only when participants coact with human 
conspecifics. The joint Simon effect completely disappeared when participants interacted with 
a wooden hand analogue. However, as outlined above in contrast to the Tsai and Brass (2007) 
findings the motor priming effect in the present study was smaller but still present when 
participants believed that the observed movement was produced by a non-biological agent. 
This difference might provide important insights for differential mechanisms underlying joint 
action and automatic imitation effects. While joint action effects may be mainly driven by the 
belief and the knowledge about a coactor, automatic imitation effects seem to be a combined 
effect of belief (pure imitation effect) and a spatial compatibility component (Bertenthal et al., 
2006). In line with this interpretation Tsai and colleagues (Tsai, Kuo, Hung, Tzeng, 2008) 
recently demonstrated joint Simon effects by simply telling participants that they interacted 
with another person sitting in a different room. This issue needs however further testing. 
The present results also relate to recent findings showing a modulation of motor priming by 
biological possible vs. impossible movements (Longo, Kosobud, & Bertenthal, 2008). Longo 
and colleagues observed an equivalent motor priming effect when participants observed 
biomechanically possible and impossible movements. Only when they explicitly pointed their 
subjects to the fact that the impossible movement was in fact unrealistic, they found a 
modulation of the motor priming effect. All these manipulations might have a common 
underlying cause, namely manipulating the conviction about the intentional nature of the 
observed movement. This would be in line with the assumption that at least a portion of the 
motor priming effect is driven by the attribution of intention rather than by the movement 
itself (Liepelt et al., 2008). 
At first glance the finding of a smaller motor priming effect in the wooden hand group as 
compared to the human hand group seem to be in contrast with previous findings showing that 
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people attribute social roles and intentions even to simple moving geometric shapes (Heider 
and Simmel, 1944). The present findings, however seem to suggest that what matters with 
respect to the attribution of animacy and intentions to a certain stimulus is not only what 
people see, but what they believe to see is animate or not.   
Animacy and Motor Priming 
But how do beliefs about animacy of the observed agent influence motor priming? There are 
two potential interpretations for this top-down influence on motor priming. On the one hand 
one can argue that beliefs about animacy modulate the attention people direct to the stimuli 
(attention hypothesis). On the other hand, one can argue that a kind of gating mechanism 
controls access to the mirror system (gating hypothesis). Longo and Bertenthal (2009) 
recently argued in favour of the attention hypothesis. In their experiment they presented a 
virtual hand or a videotaped real hand. Both the virtual hand and the real hand produced a 
substantial motor priming effect. However, when participants where explicitly briefed that the 
hands were computer animated the motor priming effect was reduced for the virtual hand but 
not for the real hand. Longo and Bertenthal argued that the instruction raised the knowledge 
about the artificiality of the hand from subsidiary into focal awareness and therefore the 
virtual hand was perceived as virtual, leading to a smaller motor priming effect. However, in 
the present experiment the stimuli could be interpreted as biological or as non-biological 
stimuli. In fact the interpretation as biological stimuli was even more plausible. Nevertheless, 
a belief manipulation led to an attenuation of the motor priming effect. In this sense, our 
findings are more in accordance with a gating hypothesis rather then an attention hypothesis. 
When participants believe an observed movement is produced by a biological agent they show 
the classical motor priming effect. However, when they believe the movement stems from a 
non-intentional agent the movement does not gain privileged access to the mirror system. 
However, whether the belief manipulation is successful or not depends on the stimuli. When 
observing a virtual hand or a hand in a glove, the belief manipulation is quite plausible. 
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However, when observing a real hand the manipulation is not very convincing. It is crucial to 
note, that these manipulations might operate on an implicit level. 
Conclusions 
The present findings provide further evidence for a top-down influence of beliefs on the direct 
matching system. Motor priming strongly depends on the interpretation of the observed 
behaviour even in a situation where the stimuli are physically identical. Furthermore, we 
propose a gating hypothesis of motor priming, suggesting that only behaviour perceived as 
intentional gains privileged access to the mirror system.
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. The figures shows illustrations of  (A) a human-hand model, (B) a wooden-hand 
model used to manipulate participants belief and (C) the stimulus display, a leather-hand 
movement in a congruent condition of the present experiment. 
Figure 2. Shown is the stimulus sequence for each trial, depicting a finger movement as used 
in the present experiment. Each trial started with a picture (displayed for 800 ms) showing a 
static hand. In the second frame (displayed for 1915 ms) the symbolic imperative stimulus ‘1’ 
or ‘2’ appeared between a lifted index or middle finger. The symbolic stimulus and the 
moving finger appeared together. Participants had to respond within 2000 ms. The reaction 
was followed by a tonal feedback for 50 ms and a constant inter-stimulus interval (ISI). 
Figure 3a. Mean reaction times (in milliseconds) of the present experiment as a function of 
group (human-hand model group and wooden-hand model group) and congruency (con: 
congruent and icon: incongruent). Error bars represent standard deviations of the mean. 
Figure 3b. Mean errors (in percent) of the present experiment as a function of group (human-
hand model group and wooden-hand model group) and congruency (con: congruent and icon: 
incongruent). Error bars represent standard deviations of the mean. 
Figure 4. Effect sizes of the congruency effects (in milliseconds) of the present experiment as 
a function of group (human-hand model group and wooden-hand model group). Error bars 
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Figure 1: (A) Human-hand model, (B) Wooden-hand model and (C) Stimulus display 
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Figure 2: Trial sequence 
 
 
Animacy and Motor Priming 
 21 
Figure 3a: Mean reaction times 
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Figure 3b: Mean percent errors 
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